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THE "REASONABLENESS" OF THE
INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION: AN
"AD HOC" CONSTITUTIONAL
TEST
CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN*
Nowhere is the acknowledgment of tension in a free soci-
ety between governmental power and personal liberty' more
pointed than in the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment,2 and in no statement does the rationale of that
warrant requirement find more classic expression than in the
comments of orator William Pitt:
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the
forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake;
the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the
rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all
his force does not cross the threshold of the ruined
tenement.
* A.B., Marquette University, 1971; J.D., Marquette University Law School,
1973; Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Joseph R. Wall in the research
of footnote material for this article.
I. See H. WAY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1-2
(1980).
2. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. Quoted in N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 49-50 (1970).
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The United States Supreme Court has consistently
eroded the warrant requirement when compelling state in-
terest has demanded it in the areas of seizures of persons and
seizures of things. Throughout, it has maintained a distinc-
tion between the two types of seizures.4 However, in the rap-
idly developing law of the investigative detention, one of the
newly recognized categorical exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement, these distinctions in large part have been obliter-
ated. Moreover, the recent cases of Florida v. Royer 5 and
United States v. Place6 appear to be the latest in a series of
Supreme Court decisions, commencing with Terry v. Ohio7
and Michigan v. Summers,8 which ostensibly combine to
structure a framework for testing the constitutionality of the
investigative detention - a test whose prongs are at best dif-
ficult to ascertain and at worst vest unfettered discretion in
the hands of law enforcement officers.
4. See generally 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT §§ 5.1, 5.5 (1978 & Supp. 1984).
5. 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (plurality opinion).
6. 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
7. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (warrant to
search bar for drugs did not authorize officers to pat-down customers without reason-
able belief that customers were armed and dangerous); Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200 (1979) (Terry and its progeny do not support state's application of a balanc-
ing test to custodial interrogations to justify mere "reasonable suspicion" as standard
relevant to seizures for interrogative purposes); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663
(1979) (except where there is an "articulable and reasonable suspicion" that either the
vehicle or an occupant is subject to seizure for violating the law, "stopping an auto-
mobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and the registra-
tion of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (a vehicle may be stopped at a fixed
checkpoint for brief questioning of its occupants even though there is no reason to
believe the particular vehicle contains illegal aliens); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) ("when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to sus-
pect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he
may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.");
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (informant's tip provided officer with reason-
able suspicion sufficient to justify limited intrusion upon suspect to insure officer's
safety); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (utilizing Terry to justify the
proper parameters of a "search incident to an arrest"); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40, 65 (1968) (rejecting as unreasonable officer's reaching into suspect's pocket to re-
move packet of heroin: "The search was not reasonably limited in scope to the ac-
complishment of the only goal which might conceivably have justified its inception -
the protection of the officer by disarming a potentially dangerous man.").
8. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
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What is apparent in a study of the evolution of the con-
stitutional test is that the Court has no prevailing ideology as
to the parameters of the investigative detention other than a
general deference to law enforcement interests and practices
in crime prevention. The result is a constitutional test whose
prongs have evolved on a happenstance basis according to
the individual facts at issue in a given case. Hence, any
analysis of the constitutional test must necessarily involve an
examination of the factual minutiae upon which each of the
prongs of the test is premised.
I. TERRY: THE "STOP AND FRISK"
In the 1968 case of Terry v. Ohio,9 the Supreme Court
considered whether it is always unreasonable for a police of-
9. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Prior to the Terry decision, a number of authors prepared
thorough analyses of the then existing state of investigative detention law. These arti-
cles discuss the underpinnings of the investigative detention and the legal arguments
both for and against it. They also acclimate the reader to the prevailing sentiments at
the time immediately prior to the Terry decision. See generally Abrams, Constitu-
tional Limitations on Detention for Investigation, 52 IowA L. REv. 1093, 1117 (1967)
(specifically, arguing that the reasonableness doctrine should not be employed to cir-
cumvent the protections of the warrant clause; "the fourth amendment's first clause,
unreasonable search and seizure, is subordinate to, and must be consistent with, the
warrant clause"); Finkel & Oberman, The ConstitutionalArguments Against "Stop and
Frisk," 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 441 (1967) (full text of brief filed with United States
Supreme Court by petitioners in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); comprehen-
sive discussion of constitutional argument against allowing what petitioners claimed
was, in essence, an arrest or seizure on less than probable cause); Kuh, In-FieldInter-
rogation: Stop, Question, Detention and Frisk, 3 CrM. L. BULL. 597 (1967) (text of
speech given to law enforcement officers prior to Terry decision; practical examples of
"reasonable suspicion"); Raphael, "Stop and Frisk" in a Nutshell Some Last Editorial
Thrusts andParries Before it AllBecomes History, 20 ALA. L. REv. 294 (1968) (identi-
fication of constitutional problems inherent in stop and frisk statutes and discussion
of implications inherent in promulgating such statutes).
A line of Wisconsin cases follows the Terry progression. See generally State v.
Williamson, 113 Wis. 2d 389, 335 N.W.2d 814 (1983) (upholding pat-down search of
defendant which revealed a loaded pistol; justified under totality of the circumstances
in that two men approached squad car, stopped and stared at officers, and one re-
sponded that he had been previously convicted of carrying a gun and was currently
wanted); State v. Goebel, 103 Wis. 2d 203, 307 N.W.2d 915 (1981) (officer justified in
detaining and questioning defendant stopped in automobile in order to establish his
identity and an explanation of his suspicious conduct consisting of nervousness and
quick motions as if to place something under his car seat); State v. Flynn, 92 Wis. 2d
427, 285 N.W.2d 710 (1979) (upholding officer's removal of wallet from defendant's
pocket after defendant refused to identify himself; court observed that confrontation
occurred in early morning hours when street was otherwise deserted, that burglary
had been committed in area half-hour earlier, and that defendant had just emerged
from an alley in company of suspect fitting description of burglar); Wendricks v.
1984]
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ficer to seize a person and subject him or her to a limited
search for weapons when there is no probable cause for an
arrest.' 0 Rejecting the argument that a "stop" and a "frisk"
do not rise to the level of a "search" and a "seizure" within
the meaning of the fourth amendment," the Court invoked
the "unreasonable search and seizure" language of the
fourth amendment" as the general premise upon which to
assess their constitutionality. That is, it attempted to ascer-
State, 72 Wis. 2d 717, 242 N.W.2d 187 (1976) (investigative stop valid where, follow-
ing an armed robbery of store, officers noticed suspicious occupants in a taxi and,
upon stopping the taxi and ordering occupants out, found a gun); Jones (Hollis) v.
State, 70 Wis. 2d 62, 69, 233 N.W.2d 441, 445 (1975) ("A temporary investigative stop
of one possessing information as to a crime may certainly be reasonable, depending
upon the exigencies of the situation."); State v. Williamson, 58 Wis. 2d 514, 206
N.W.2d 613 (1973) (extending Terry principles to the stop of an automobile); State v.
Beaty, 57 Wis. 2d 531, 205 N.W.2d 11 (1973) (upholding search in which as a result of
protective pat-down, officer felt several large lumps in defendant's pocket, reached in,
and pulled out coins and papers which were evidence of the burglary for which he
was convicted); Waite v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 218, 222, 203 N.W.2d 719, 721 (1973)
("Given the fact of a suspicious bulge in an outer coat pocket, the officer acted reason-
ably and for his own protection in determining what caused the bulge."); State v.
Chambers, 55 Wis. 2d 289, 198 N.W.2d 377 (1972) (during valid consent search of
apartment for drugs, officers patted defendant down upon his entry into the dwelling;
pat-down was valid in that drug search created a volatile atmosphere in which officers
were outnumbered by apartment occupants, and defendant had entered the dwelling
unannounced wearing a heavy jacket with large pockets). See also Wis. STAT.
§ 968.24 (1981-82) (temporary questioning without arrest); Wis. STAT. § 968.05 (1981-
82) (search during temporary questioning).
10. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 15.
11. The Court noted:
[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to
walk away, he has "seized" that person. And it is nothing less than sheer tor-
ture of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer
surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find
weapons is not a "search."
Id at 16. Circumstances which elevate a simple encounter to a seizure and distinc-
tions between "types" of seizures are now open to greater scrutiny as a result of the
Terry line of cases. See Williamson, The Dimensions of Seizure: The Concepts of
"Stop" and "'Arrest," 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 771 (1982) (examining the determination of
when there has been a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment and the
distinction between seizures in the nature of a stop and those that constitute an ar-
rest). See also LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution Terry, Sibron, Pe-
ters, andBeyond, 67 MICH. L. Rav. 40 (1968) (criticizing lack of specific guidelines in
the early Court opinions; comprehensive discussion of the leading early cases and
predicted implications); Landynski, The Supreme Court's Searchfor Fourth Amend-
ment Standards: The Problem of Stop and Frisk, 45 CONN. B.J. 146 (1971) (analyzing
Terry, Sibron, and Peters).
12. See supra note 2.
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tain the "reasonableness," given the circumstances, of the
particular governmental invasion of the citizen's personal
security.' 3
The first step in the Terry Court's fourth amendment
analysis was a determination of whether the governmental
interest which allegedly justified the intrusion outweighed
the nature of the intrusion itself.14 Failing that, there would
be no need to inquire further; the intrusion would be per se
unreasonable and hence violative of the fourth amend-
ment.1 5 However, once the governmental interest to be
served could be seen to outweigh the intrusiveness of the po-
lice conduct, it was necessary to look specifically to the par-
ticular conduct at issue in the police-citizen encounter. 16
The Court recognized that at this second step its inquiry was
a dual one: to ascertain "whether the officer's action was
justified at its inception, and whether [the officer's action]
was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place."' 7 Moreover, in
assessing whether the police officer's conduct in a "stop and
frisk" situation was justified at its inception, the Supreme
Court announced that a police officer "must be able to point
to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion."' i8 Furthermore, the Court noted that this stan-
dard exceeded mere subjective "good faith" on the part of
the police officer 19 and was to be measured by objective cri-
teria: "[Whether] the facts available to the officer at the mo-
ment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of
13. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.
14. Seeid. at 20-21 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-
37 (1967)).
15. 392 U.S. at 20-21.
16. Id. at 21.
17. Id. at 20-21.
18. Id. at 21.
19. Id. at 22. The Court placed a check on the individual officer's discretion
when it stated:
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is
assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the
laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who
must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of
the particular circumstances.
Id. at 21 (footnote omitted).
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reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was
appropriate. ' 20 As to the second aspect of the Court's dual
inquiry - the relationship of the scope to the intrusive ac-
tion - the Court was more restrictive, confining its defini-
tion of scope to "that which is necessary for the discovery of
weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others
nearby . ... 1
Thus, in recognition of a legitimate government interest
in crime prevention, 22 the Court designed a test for deciding
the constitutionality of a stop and frisk for weapons which
required: (1) a balancing of the governmental interest
against the nature of the intrusion; and, in the event the bal-
ance weighed in favor of the government, (2) an objective or
"reasonable person" assessment of whether the police officer
could point to specific and articulable facts which warranted
a belief that criminal activity might be afoot and that the
suspect might be armed and dangerous; 23 and (3) an assess-
ment of whether the frisk was confined in scope to the dis-
covery of weapons on the suspect.
Following the Terry decision, the question of under what
circumstances the dictates of Terry become applicable posed
considerable dilemma. In retrospect,24 it is relatively clear
that the Terry Court intended its test to apply only to situa-
tions involving a forcible stop, that is, to those situations in
which the police had a right to insist upon an encounter, and
20. Id. at 21-22.
21. Id. at 26.
22. The Terry court emphasized that it was dealing with "an entire rubric of po-
lice conduct - necessarily swift action predicated upon on-the-spot observation of
the officer on the beat - which historically has not been, and as a practical matter
could not be, subjected to the warrant requirement." Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. It was
thus clearly concerned with an extension of governmental authority in the area of
crime prevention as opposed to crime detection. See also 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 4,
§ 9.2; H. WAY, supra note 1, at 53-55.
23. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
24. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 509-11 (1983) (plurality opinion) (Bren-
nan, J, concurring); U.S. v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2649 (1983) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring). Justice Brennan emphasized in both opinions that Terry and Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), were essentially premised upon a safety rationale and
that United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1981), was premised upon the
compelling government interest in stemming the flow of illegal aliens. See also Duna-
way v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208-12 (1979) (discussing the narrow scope of Terry
and its immediate progeny).
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only to those situations specifically involving a forceable
"stop" and accompanying "frisk":
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude
in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of in-
vestigating this behavior he identifies himself as a police-
man and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in
the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his rea-
sonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for
the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct
a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such per-
sons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be
used to assault him.25
Furthermore, in a footnote, the Court pointedly declined to
apply Terry principles either to an interrogation or to a sim-
ple police-citizen "encounter" which did not also involve a
"seizure" of the person.26 The implication in the latter situa-
tion was simply that since there was no "seizure" of the per-
son, the fourth amendment did not apply. Thus,
immediately after the Terry decision, there existed four types
of police-citizen encounters susceptible to varying degrees of
scrutiny under the fourth amendment: (1) a simple encoun-
ter involving no seizure of the person; (2) the investigative
detention or investigative interrogation premised upon
something less than probable cause, the constitutionality of
which was as yet untested; (3) the "stop and frisk"; and (4)
an arrest.
25. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. See also Wis. STAT. § 968.05 (1981-82) (employing
similar wording).
26. The court stated:
We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitutional propriety of an
investigative "seizure" upon less than probable cause for purposes of "deten-
tion" and/or interrogation. Obviously, not all personal intercourse between
policemen and citizens involves "seizures" of persons. Only when the officer,
by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained
the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a "seizure" has occurred.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
1984]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
II. MENDENHALL: SEEDS OF THE
INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION
The issue of when a simple encounter became a seizure
so as to bring it within the purview of the fourth amendment
was answered to some extent by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Mendenhall27 The Mendenhali case in-
volved a confrontation between federal narcotics officers and
a defendant on the concourse of an airport terminal. The
defendant had arrived in Detroit on a commercial airline
flight from Los Angeles. She was observed by two agents
from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) who
claimed that her conduct was characteristic of a drug courier
in that her actions met those noted in the government's
"drug courier proffle. ' ' 28 The officers approached her and
asked to see her ticket, which they discovered bore a differ-
ent name than did her license. Although the defendant ap-
peared nervous and shaken, she complied when asked to
accompany the agents to the DEA office for further ques-
tioning. Once she entered the DEA office, an agent asked
the defendant if she would consent to the search of her per-
son and her handbag, informing her that she had the right to
refuse to do so. 29 The defendant responded, "Go ahead."
At that point, a policewoman arrived and told the defendant
that the search would require her to remove her clothing.
The defendant responded that she had a plane to catch, to
27. 446 U.S. 544 (1980). See generally Greenberg, Drug Courier Profiles, Men-
denhall and Reid: Analyzing Police Intrusions on Less than Probable Cause, 19 AM.
CRIM, L. REV. 49 (1981) (examining the Court's decisions regarding searches based
upon drug courier profiles and recommending that because "consent" entails inherent
evidentiary problems it should be excluded as a justification for "limited intrusive
police actions"); Comment, Reformulating Seizures - Airport Drug Stops and the
Fourth Amendment, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1486 (1981) (arguing that determining whether
a seizure has occurred is inconsistent with the principles of Terry and advocating that
airport drug stops are seizures and as such trigger application of the Terry reasonable-
ness balancing test); Comment, Mendenhall and Reid: The Drug Courier Profile and
Investigative Stops, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 835 (1981) (analyzing whether, under Terry,
an investigatory stop can be justified solely on the basis that a person matches certain
characteristics which are contained in the drug courier profile); Note, United States v.
Mendenhall- DEA Airport Search and Seizure, 16 NEw ENG. L. REv. 597 (1981) (fea-
turing commentary and analysis of Mendenhall and other cases involving DEA stop
and seizure); Note, Airport Drug Seizures." How the Federal Courts Strike the Fourth
Amendment Balance, 58 NOTRE DAME LAW. 668 (1983) (discussing Mendenhall).
28. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547 n.l.
29. Id. at 548.
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which the agent replied that if no narcotics were found there
would be no further delay. The defendant then began to dis-
robe, removing two packages of heroin from beneath her
clothing in the process.
In the course of a much divided opinion, ° the Supreme
Court dissected the police conduct into three stages: (1) the
initial stop on the concourse, (2) the removal of the defend-
ant from the concourse to the DEA offices, and (3) the strip
search. In response to the government's argument that the
defendant had consented to the search of her person, the
Court undertook an analysis of whether the defendant's con-
sent was in fact voluntarily given or tainted by earlier police
conduct violative of the fourth amendment. In so doing, the
Court implied that there were three options available with
regard to the initial encounter on the concourse: (1) it was
not a seizure; (2) it was a seizure which met the requirements
of a Terry "stop and frisk"; or (3) it was an arrest for which a
finding of probable cause was necessary.
Reaffirming the concurring opinions of Justices White
and Harlan in Terry and therefore the existence of a simple
encounter which invokes no constitutional protections, the
Court once again noted that " '[t]here is nothing in the Con-
stitution which prevents a policeman from addressing ques-
tions to anyone on the streets' "31 although "'ordinarily the
person addressed has an equal right to ignore his interroga-
tor and walk away.' ",32 However, it went on to distinguish
such an encounter from a "seizure" subject to fourth amend-
30. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, Blackmun, and Powell
agreed that there were three phases to the police-citizen encounter at issue in Menden-
halt. the initial encounter on the concourse, the removal to the DEA offices, and the
strip search. Justices Stewart and Rhenquist validated all three encounters on the
basis of consent. They found that the encounter on the concourse did not amount to a
seizure which would have vitiated the consent given by Mendenhall in the second and
third phases of the encounter. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Pow-
ell, however, felt the question of seizure on the concourse was too close and therefore
assumed that a seizure had in fact occurred. They nevertheless found this seizure
constitutional under the Terry test. They then justified the removal to the DEA offices
and the strip search on the basis of Mendenhal's untainted consent. Justices White,
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented.
31. Id. at 553 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J.,
concurring)).
32. 446 U.S. at 553 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
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ment review, thereby acknowledging in law the second class
of police-citizen confrontation which had been alluded to
earlier in Terry:
We adhere to the view that a person is "seized" only when,
by means of physical force or a show of authority, his free-
dom of movement is restrained. Only when such restraint
is imposed is there any foundation whatever for invoking
constitutional safeguards. . . .As long as the person to
whom questions are put remains free to disregard the ques-
tions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that
person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution
require some particularized and objective justification? 3
Nor was the standard for ascertaining a "seizure"
promulgated as a subjective standard dependent upon the
subjective belief of either the person "seized" or the intent of
police to detain the suspect.3 4 Instead, the Court once again
utilized a "reasonable person" standard, ruling that a person
is "seized" within the meaning of the fourth amendment
"only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have believed he was
not free to leave. 35 Thus, unless the presence of the officers
was "threatening," or there was some physical touching, a
compelling tone of voice, or a display of weapons,36 a belief
by the citizen that he or she was "seized" would under no
circumstances be objectively reasonable. 7 Utilizing this
33. 446 U.S. at 553-54.
34. See id. at 554 n.6, where the Court stated: "We agree with the District Court
that the subjective intention of the DEA agent in this case to detain the respondent,
had she attempted to leave, is irrelevant except insofar as that may have been con-
veyed to the respondent."
35. Id. at 554.
36. See id.
37. The Court specifically refused to recognize as relevant to the existence of a
seizure the fact that the person made statements or acted in a manner contrary to his
or her interests. See id. at 555-56. Therefore, no matter what the feelings of the citi-
zen, if these feelings are not supported by objectively identifiable police conduct, they
are of no consequence to the determination of whether a seizure occurred.
The Supreme Court has most recently applied this same standard in the case of
Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984). The Court
determined that the actions of Immigration and Naturalization Service agents in sys-
tematically moving through a factory to inquire as to workers' citizenship while other
INS agents were stationed at each exit did not constitute a fourth amendment seizure
of the factory's work force. In a decision which Justice Brennan characterized as
being "rooted more in fantasy than in the record," id at 1769 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing), the majority concluded that although agents were stationed at the factory exits,
[Vol. 67:641
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standard, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist found no seizure
in any of the police activities which occurred on the con-
course and justified the removal to the DEA offices and the
strip search on the basis of consent, untainted by any uncon-
stitutional DEA conduct on the concourse.3 3
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Blackmun
joined in that determination.3 9 However, they found the
question of the existence of a seizure on the concourse ex-
tremely close and assumed therefore that the stop did in fact
constitute a seizure.40 Nevertheless, it was their determina-
tion that such conduct by the DEA officers could be justified
under the principles enunciated in Terry.
Thus, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and
Blackmun took up the issue left undecided by the majority
in Terry and in fact recognized the applicability of Terry
principles to a police stop or a police detention for purposes
of investigation.4' Utilizing the first prong of the Terry test,
the justices encountered little difficulty in ascertaining a
compelling governmental interest in detecting "those who
would traffic in deadly drugs for personal profit, ' 42 and in
ascertaining that the intrusion upon Mendenhall's privacy
was minimal.43 Nor did they perceive any problem in justi-
fying the officer's action in detaining Ms. Mendenhall. De-
spite Justice Powell's statements to the contrary,44 it was the
displayed badges, carried walkie-talkies, and were armed, there was nothing in their
conduct to suggest an intent to prevent people from leaving. 104 S. Ct. at 1763. In-
stead, the Court determined that "the obvious purpose of the agents' presence at the
factory doors was to insure that all persons in the factories were questioned." Id. The
"mere possibility" that workers would be questioned if they sought to leave should
not, therefore, have resulted in "any reasonable apprehension by any of them that
they would be seized or detained in any meaningfulway." Id at 1764 (emphasis ad-
ded).
Although the Court disclaims any decision on the precise issue, id. at 1762, it
seems apparent that whatever "objective" Mendenhall factors may be present. mere
questioning of an individual by police, without more, does not constitute a seizure of
the person under the fourth amendment.
38. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558-60.
39. See id. at 560 (Powell, J., concurring).
40. See id
41. See id. at 560-61 (citing Terry for the general proposition "that a reasonable
investigative stop does not offend the Fourth Amendment.").
42. Id. at 561.
43. Id. at 562-63.
44. Id at 565 n.6.
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fact that Mendenhall's conduct on the concourse met the
government's drug courier profile that clearly qualified as an
articulable basis for the suspicion of criminal activity. Hav-
ing established that her detention on the concourse was con-
stitutionally justifiable, her consent to be removed to the
DEA offices and her consent to the search of her person
while in those offices was constitutionally sound. The con-
curring justices, therefore, did not proceed further to analyze
the reasonableness of the scope of the intrusion upon her
person while on the airport concourse.
III. SUMMERS: INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION
The categorical extension of Terry stop-and-frisk princi-
ples to those situations involving limited intrusions or inves-
tigative detentions which fall short of an arrest occurred in
Michigan v. Summers.45 Utilizing a process of inductive rea-
soning from the holdings of such cases as Terry, Adams v.
Williams,46 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,47 and United
45. 452 U.S. 692 (1981). See generally Note, Gauging the Reasonableness of
Nonarrest Seizures: The Emerging Rule of Michigan v. Summers, 46 ALB. L. REv. 631
(1982) (asserting that, because the detention in Summers satisfied neither Terry nor
Brignoni-Ponce, the Court established a third exception to the rule that the Constitu-
tion requires seizures to be based on probable cause); Note, Michigan v. Summers:
Stop and Fish;, 9 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 549 (1982); Note, The Eroding Force ofthe Inves-
tigatory Stop Under Fourth Amendment Constitutional Doctrine, 17 VAL. U.L. REV.
471 (1983).
46. 407 U.S. 143 (1972). The Adams case was the Court's first appreciable discus-
sion of Terry. In Adams a reliable informant told a police officer that a man in a car
carried a gun at his waist and narcotics in his car. The officer approached the car and
asked the suspect to step out of the car. The suspect rolled down his window instead.
The officer then reached through the window and removed a gun from the suspect's
waist, precisely where the informant said it would be. A subsequent search of the car
disclosed narcotics.
In upholding as reasonable the officer's actions, the Supreme Court stated: "So
long as the officer is entitled to make a forcible stop, and has reason to believe that the
suspect is armed and dangerous, he may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to
this protective purpose." Id. at 146. The Court supported its decision by pointing out
that the informant was known to the officer and was reliable, the incident took place
in an area of high crime, and the officer had reason to fear for his safety. Further-
more, reaching into the suspect's waist was a limitedintrusion, necessary to insure the
officer's safety. Id. at 146-48.
In separate dissents, Justices Brennan and Douglas took issue with the majority's
extension of Terry to "possessory offenses."
47. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). The Brignoni-Ponce case concerned random stops of
vehicles near the Mexican border by U.S. Border Patrol agents for the purpose of
determining the citizenship of the vehicles' occupants. In this particular case the
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States v. Cortez,48 a process soundly criticized by Justice
Stewart in his dissent,49 the Summers majority concluded
agents stopped the suspect's car because "its three occupants appeared to be of Mexi-
can descent." Id. at 875. The agents arrested the occupants upon discovering they
were illegal aliens. The Court held that the agent's observations did not furnish "rea-
sonable grounds to believe the three occupants were aliens." Id at 886.
In setting aside the stop as unreasonable, the Court set the parameters of a valid
border stop stating:
[B]ecause of the importance of the governmental interest at stake, the minimal
intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for policing
the border, we hold that when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to
suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the
country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that
provoke suspicion.
Id. at 881 (emphasis added).
Perhaps anticipating its decision in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976), the Court went beyond the facts before it and broadly concluded that
"[eixcept at the border and its functional equivalents, officers on roving patrol may
stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational
inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles con-
tain aliens who may be illegally in the country." Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884
(emphasis added).
Within the year, the Court decided United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976). The case is distinguishable from Brignoni-Ponce in that Brignoni-Ponce in-
volved roving patrol stops while Martinez-Fuerte dealt with stops at permanent check-
points. In Martinez-Fuerte the Court held that a vehicle may be stopped at a fixed
checkpoint for brief questioning of its occupants even though there is no reason to
believe the particular vehicle contains illegal aliens. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562,
566-67. The Court viewed a roving patrol stop as a more ominous intrusion and
observed that "the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers
• . . is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop." Id at 558. Cf United States
v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896-97 (1975) ("at traffic checkpoints removed from the border
and its functional equivalents, officers may not search private vehicles without con-
sent or probable cause.") (emphasis added).
48. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
49. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 706-12 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (criticizing the esca-
lation of limited exceptions to the probable cause requirement for arrest into a "gen-
eral rule").
Justice Stewart could justify only two limited types of seizures warranting less
than probable cause. See id. at 706. The first exception is the Terry line of cases
which allows a limited stop to question an individual and perform a pat-down search
for weapons if the officer has reason to believe the suspect may be armed. The second
exception is a brief stop of vehicles near the United States border to question occu-
pants about their citizenship, as in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976). See Summers, 452 U.S. at 706 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Stewart saw as a common element in the Terry and border checkpoint exceptions
"[s]ome governmental interest independent of the ordinary interest in investigating
crime and apprehending suspects .... " Id at 707. In Terry it was the safety of the
police officer, in the border checkpoint cases it was the "unique difficulty of patrolling
a 2,000-mile long and virtually uninhabited border area. . . ." Id at 708. Consis-
tent with the special governmental interest inherent in these limited exceptions, Stew-
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that there categorically exist
some seizures admittedly covered by the Fourth Amend-
ment [which] constitute such limited intrusions on the per-
sonal security of those detained and are justified by such
substantial law enforcement interests that they may be
made on less than probable cause, so long as police have an
articulable basis for suspecting criminal activity."
In Summers, the issue was whether the detention of the
respondent during the search of his house violated his fourth
amendment rights. Police officers had in their possession a
validly authorized search warrant for respondent's house
and were about to execute it when they encountered the re-
spondent descending the front steps. They requested his
assistance in gaining entry to the premises and detained him
while they conducted their search." After finding narcotics
in the basement of the house, the police arrested respondent,
searched him, and found heroin in his coat pocket. Re-
spondent was then charged with possession of the heroin
found on his person.
Having determined early in the opinion that a limited
governmental intrusion upon the rights of an individual
could constitutionally survive a finding of less than probable
cause, 52 the Court proceeded by implication to invoke the
Terry test. The Court thus initiated its discussion of the con-
stitutionality of the limited intrusion at issue by balancing
the justification for the intrusion, that is, the governmental
interest, against the nature of the intrusion itself.5 3 The par-
ticular governmental interests at stake in Summers were typ-
ical of preventive law enforcement interests. 54  They
included: the law enforcement interest in preventing the
owner's flight in the event incriminating evidence was found;
the interest in minimizing the risk of harm to the officers in
art contended that "the government must demonstrate an important purpose beyond
the normal goals of criminal investigation, or must demonstrate an extraordinary ob-
stacle to such investigation." Id. However, Stewart concluded, the objectives sought
to be attained in Summers "represented nothing more than the ordinary police inter-
est in discovering evidence of crime and apprehending wrongdoers." Id. at 709.
50. 452 U.S. at 699.
51. Id. at 693.
52. See id. at 697, 699.
53. See id. at 701-05.
54. See supra note 22.
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that a search warrant might precipitate violent or frantic ef-
forts to conceal or destroy evidence; and finally, the interest
in the orderly completion of the search, which would be fa-
cilitated by the presence of the owner.5 5
The Court noted that although the detention of a resi-
dent of the premises pursuant to a valid search warrant was
admittedly a significant restraint on the resident's liberty,56 it
was qualitatively less intrusive than the search of the prem-
ises, for which probable cause had already been found by a
neutral and detached magistrate, and "substantially less in-
trusive" than an arrest.5 7 Proceeding, then, to assess the rea-
sonableness of the police conduct and hence its
constitutionality, the Court, consistent with the Terry test, re-
quired an articulable basis for justifying the detention of the
resident. 8 That basis existed by virtue of the validly author-
ized search warrant. The Court stated that if evidence that a
citizen's residence is harboring contraband is sufficient to
persuade a neutral and detached magistrate to issue a search
warrant, thereby justifying an invasion of the resident's pri-
vacy in that respect, that same evidence must constitution-
ally justify the detention of that resident during the search of
those premises:
The existence of a search warrant . . . provides an objec-
tive justification for the detention. A judicial officer has
determined that police have probable cause to believe that
someone in the home is committing a crime. Thus a neu-
tral magistrate rather than an officer in the field has made
the critical determination that the police should be given a
special authorization to thrust themselves into the privacy
of a home. The connection of an occupant to that home
gives the police officer an easily identifiable and certain ba-
sis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justi-
fies a detention of that occupant.5 9
Thus, the existence of a validly authorized search war-
rant itself provided a reasonable and articulable suspicion
that the resident or owner of the premises was involved in
55. See Summer, 452 U.S. at 702-03.
56. Id at 701.
57. Id at 702 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979)).
58. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 703.
59. Id. at 703-04 (footnote omitted).
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criminal activity just as did the defendant's meeting the drug
courier profile in United States v. Mendenhall.60 Once again,
however, the Court omitted any discussion of the scope of
the detention - its purpose or length - as affecting the con-
stitutionality of the detention under Terry, except to com-
ment in a footnote that a "prolonged detention" or other
"special circumstances" might render the detention constitu-
tionally unreasonable.61 A detention for the duration of the
search of the premises, however, was presumably not uncon-
stitutional as to scope, at least insofar as scope involved the
element of length of time.
IV. RoYER: SCOPE LIMITATIONS
The importance of Florida v. Royer 62 lies, to some extent,
in the fact that for the first time the Supreme Court at-
tempted to assess the impact of the third prong of the Terry
test - that the officer's conduct must be reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances which justified the intrusion on
the citizen's liberty in the first place - to the newly-ac-
knowledged category of investigative or police detentions
which fall short of arrest. In Royer, as in United States v.
Mendenhal/,6 there existed three distinct police-citizen con-
frontations, each of which was subject to judicial review.
The first encounter occurred on the airport concourse.
Detectives, believing Royer met the drug courier profile by
his appearance, mannerisms, luggage, and actions, ap-
proached him, identified themselves as police officers, and
asked whether he had a moment to speak with them. Royer
replied that he did.64 At the detectives' request, Royer pro-
duced his airline ticket and driver's license, which bore dif-
ferent names. When questioned about the discrepancy,
Royer explained that a friend had made the plane reserva-
tions for him. He became noticeably nervous, whereupon
60. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
61. "Although special circumstances, or possibly a prolonged detention, might
lead to a different conclusion in an unusual case, we are persuaded that this routine
detention of residents of a house while it was being searched for contraband pursuant
to a valid warrant is not such a case." 452 U.S. at 705 n.21.
62. 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (plurality opinion).
63. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
64. Royer, 460 U.S. at 494.
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the detectives identified themselves as narcotics investigators
and told Royer they suspected him of trafficking in narcotics.
The second encounter occurred when the detectives, in-
stead of returning Royer's airline ticket or driver's license,
asked him to accompany them to a large storage closet.
Royer said nothing, but accompanied the detectives. Then,
without Royer's consent, the detectives used Royer's bag-
gage stubs to retrieve his luggage.65
The third and final encounter occurred when detectives
asked Royer if he would consent to the search of his suit-
cases. Royer did not orally respond but instead produced a
key and unlocked one of the suitcases, which a detective
then opened. Detectives found drugs in that suitcase, where-
upon Royer stated that he did not know the combination to
the second suitcase. When asked if he objected to detectives
forcibly opening the second suitcase irrespective of damage,
Royer replied, "No, go ahead." The second suitcase was
thereupon pried open, marijuana was found, and Royer was
arrested.66 The Florida intermediate appeals court, on mo-
tion for rehearing en banc, reversed Royer's conviction, cit-ing Royer's removal to the storage closet as an involuntary
police confinement which exceeded the "limited restraint of
a Terry investigatory stop" and was unsupported by prob-
able cause, thus vitiating any consent manifested by Royer
to the search of his luggage.67
Agreeing with the Florida court's determination, the
United States Supreme Court undertook a summarization of
police-citizen confrontation. Of some significance was the
attempt by the Court to define the parameters of an encoun-
ter which did not constitute a seizure or an investigative de-
tention: "[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the
Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual
on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he
is willing to answer some questions, [or] by putting questions
to him if the person is willing to listen .... -68 Nor does
65. Id
66. Id.
67. 389 So. 2d 1007, 1019 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
68. Royer, 460 U.S. at 497 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 n.12
(1979)).
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the fact that the officer first identifies himself or herself as a
police officer raise the simple encounter to the level of a
seizure. 69 Thus, at this stage of the simple encounter, the
person approached "need not answer any question put to
him; indeed he may decline to listen to the questions at all
and may go on his way. '70 More important, however, is the
Court's statement that the citizen's refusal to listen to the of-
ficer or answer his or her questions does not, "without
more," furnish an articulable basis to support a suspicion of
criminal activity.7' Thus, a citizen is clearly entitled to tell
police officers that he or she has nothing to say, does not
wish to talk or will not answer questions, and this refusal
alone will not translate into an articulable basis for police
suspicion of criminal activity so as to warrant any kind of
seizure or forcible stop of that person by police. The refusal
to listen to police questions will not justify any further deten-
tion by police who have no choice but to either allow the
citizen to leave or undertake a formal arrest, for which the
police must then have probable cause.
There remains unanswered, however, the question of
what conduct on the part of the citizen constitutes "some-
thing more" so as to support an investigative detention once
the citizen refuses to converse with police. For example,
does a refusal to answer questions followed by flight from
the officer's presence in and of itself provide an articulable
basis giving rise to a suspicion of criminal activity?
Perhaps the greatest significance of the Royer opinion,
however, is in its stated application of the "scope" limita-
tions of Terry to investigative detentions:
The scope of the search must be "strictly tied to and justi-
fied by the circumstances which rendered its initiation per-
missible." The reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment requires no less when the police action is a
seizure permitted on less than probable cause because of
legitimate law enforcement interests. The scope of the de-
69. 460 U.S. at 497 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555
(1980)).
70. 460 U.S. at 498 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
71. 460 U.S. at 498 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 556
(1980)).
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tention must be carefully tailored to its underlying
justification.72
The Court went on, however, to articulate a constitutional
limitation upon the scope of an investigative detention that
had previously been suggested only by way of a footnote: an
investigative detention must be "temporary. ' 73 Although
that condition is clearly reflective of the limiting footnote in
the Michigan v. Summers74 opinion, it is a term which the
Royer Court at last defined to mean "no longer than is neces-
sary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. ' 75 To this first cri-
terion in analyzing the scope of the detention, the Court then
added a second: the investigative means employed to effec-
tuate the purpose of the stop must be "the least intrusive
means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's
suspicion in a short period of time. '76
Applying these stated criteria to the investigative deten-
tion at issue in Royer, the Court apparently determined that
at the time of the first confrontation - when Royer was ini-
tially approached on the concourse and agreed to speak with
police officers - there existed nothing more than a simple
encounter, or, as the Court termed it, "a consensual inquiry
in a public place,"77 which was not subject to fourth amend-
ment scrutiny. However, when police officers entered upon
the second encounter - withholding Royer's ticket and re-
moving him to a storage closet - a seizure had occurred:
Asking for and examining Royer's ticket and his driver's
license were no doubt permissible in themselves, but when
the officers identified themselves as narcotics agents, told
Royer that he was suspected of transporting narcotics, and
asked him to accompany them to the police room, while
retaining his ticket and driver's license and without indicat-
ing in any way that he was free to depart, Royer was effec-
tively seized for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
These circumstances surely amount to a show of official
authority such that "a reasonable person would have be-
72. 460 U.S. at 500 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,310 (1967) (Fortas,
J., concurring), quoted in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)) (citations omitted).
73. 460 U.S. at 500.
74. 452 U.S. 692, 705 n.21 (1981). See supra note 61 for the text of the footnote.
75. Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 503.
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lieved he was not free to leave."78
Having thus determined that a seizure occurred, it be-
came necessary for the Court to undertake an analysis of
whether the police had a reasonable and articulable basis for
suspecting that Royer was engaged in criminal activity. The
Court concluded that such a basis in fact existed when the
officers discovered that, coupled with Royer's general con-
duct and appearance, he was traveling under an assumed
name and had paid cash for a one-way ticket.79 Such factors
constituted "adequate grounds for suspecting Royer of car-
rying drugs ' 80 and justified a temporary detention of him
and his luggage while police "attempted to verify or dispel
their suspicions in a manner that did not exceed the limits of
an investigative detention."' 8' Yet, despite these findings, the
Supreme Court reversed Royer's conviction because at some
point the permissible scope of the investigative detention
had been exceeded, resulting in a constructive arrest8 2 for
which there existed no probable cause.
The issue which remained, therefore, was the manner in
which the scope of Royer's detention was exceeded such that
police had in fact subjected him to a constructive arrest. In
its discussion of the issue, the Court once again suggested
that, under Terry, the scope of an investigative detention
must be limited in the two ways noted earlier. First, the in-
vestigative detention must be temporary; that is, it must last
"no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop."' 83 Second, the investigative means employed to effec-
tuate the purpose of the stop must be "the least intrusive
means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's
78. Id. at 501-02 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).
79. 460 U.S. at 501-02.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. For a discussion of what constitutes a traditional legal arrest, see generally 2
W. LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 5.1. However, as distinguished from the traditional ar-
rest, a constructive arrest occurs by operation of law when the actions of police, dur-
ing the course of an investigative detention, exceed the purpose or scope limitations.
Such seizures must then be founded upon probable cause rather than simply a reason-
able suspicion of criminal activity in order to be constitutional under the fourth
amendment.
83. Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.
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suspicion in a short period of time. 84 However, implicit in
the Court's discussion of the second limitation is the sugges-
tion that once a citizen has been legitimately stopped on a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the only purpose
for which he or she may be further detained is to verify or
dispel the officer's particular suspicion of criminal activity.
Thus, the Royer Court concluded that "at the time Royer
produced the key to his suitcase, the detention to which he
was then subjected was a more serious intrusion on his per-
sonal liberty than is allowable on mere suspicion of criminal
activity."'85 In short, a constructive arrest had evolved from
what had begun as an investigative detention because at the
moment Royer produced his key, both the purpose of the
investigative detention and the means utilized to effectuate
its purpose had been exceeded.
As noted earlier, once a suspect has been legitimately
stopped on suspicion of criminal activity, the only justifiable
purpose for detaining the suspect further is to verify or dis-
pel the officers' suspicions that he or she is involved in crimi-
nal activity. That purpose was apparently exceeded in Royer
because when the officers transferred the site of the encoun-
ter from the concourse to the DEA offices, their primary in-
terest was not in having an extended conversation with
Royer about his activities, "but in [determining] the contents
of his luggage, a matter which the officers did not pursue
orally with Royer until after the encounter was relocated to
the police room. ' 86 Thus, the Court concluded that "[t]he
record does not reflect any facts which would support a find-
ing that the legitimate law enforcement purposes which jus-
tified the detention in the first instance were furthered by
removing Royer to the police room .. "87
The entire rationale adopted here by the Supreme Court
makes no sense unless one assumes that the Supreme Court
at some point concluded that the suspicion upon which DEA
officials stopped Royer in the first place on the concourse
was that he carried drugs on his person. Therefore, to be
84. Id.
85. Id at 502.
86. Id. at 505.
87. Id.
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constitutional, the removal to the DEA offices could only
properly have been necessary to confirm or deny that suspi-
cion. Since DEA officials here removed him to verify or dis-
pel a suspicion that his luggage contained contraband,
however, the original purpose for which Royer was detained
was exceeded, resulting in the finding that his removal was
unconstitutional.
One is left to conclude that had police officers simply
been savvy enough to question Royer about the contents of
his luggage before they removed him from the concourse,
the scope of the investigative detention would not have been
exceeded by his removal to the DEA offices. In the alterna-
tive, the Court noted, had the police removed Royer for pur-
poses of "security and safety, ' 88 and thereafter obtained his
consent to the search of his luggage, the search might also
have been permissible. To remove him for the purpose of
obtaining his consent to search his luggage, however, was
clearly improper under the circumstances. All of this sug-
gests, of course, that the scope of the investigative detention,
at least in terms of the purpose restriction, is almost exclu-
sively within the control of the police officers initiating the
stop, so long as they have a "reasonable and articulable ba-
sis" for suspecting some type of criminal activity.
Following its discussion of the "purpose" aspect of the
scope of an investigative detention, the Court on its own ini-
tiative took up an additional issue. Perhaps anticipating its
later decision in United States v. Place,89 which had already
been argued, 90 the Court determined that the scope of the
investigative detention in Royer was also exceeded because
the means utilized by police were not the least intrusive
means available. 91 Inasmuch as there was no suggestion in
the record that trained sniff dogs were "not feasible and
available, ' 92 the Court concluded that the contents of
Royer's luggage could have been legally investigated in a
more expeditious and less intrusive manner.
88. Id
89. 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
90. Place was argued on March 2, 1983, which was after oral arguments in Royer
but before the March 23rd Royer decision.
91. Royer, 460 U.S. at 506.
92. Id. at 506.
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Although never directly decided in Royer, there is im-
plicit in this conclusion the suggestion that Royer's luggage
as well as his person could have been momentarily detained
and subjected to an "investigation" upon the same suspicion
of criminal activity that justified the investigative detention
of his person:
[T]he State has not touched on the question of whether it
would have been feasible to investigate the contents of
Royer's bags in a more expeditious way. The courts are
not strangers to the use of trained dogs to detect the pres-
ence of controlled substances in luggage. There is no indi-
cation here that this means was not feasible and available.
If it had been used, Royer and his luggage could have been
momentarily detained while this investigative procedure was
carried out. . ...193
The issue of the investigative detention of personalty was not
specifically addressed by the Court until Place. Yet it is
clear from the Royer decision that the police officers had two
options at the point of the "seizure" of Royer on the con-
course. First, they could have obtained Royer's consent to
search his luggage during the investigative detention on the
concourse. In the alternative, they could have momentarily
detained his luggage upon the same suspicion of criminal ac-
tivity that justified the detention of his person and then veri-
fied or dispelled their suspicions as to his luggage by the
least intrusive means possible - the use of trained dogs.
Once again, however, there remains the issue footnoted
by Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion: whether it
will ever be constitutional to pry luggage open pursuant to a
suspicion that such luggage contains contraband, simply be-
cause of the unavailability of trained dogs or any other less
intrusive means. 94 Brennan's concern was that an investiga-
tive detention which is otherwise unreasonable could be-
come reasonable simply because of the unavailability of a
less intrusive means. The plurality opinion omits any re-
sponse to this issue, relying instead upon the necessity of a
case-by-case analysis: "We do not suggest that there is a lit-
mus-paper test for distinguishing a consensual encounter
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. See id at 511 (Brennan, J., concurring) (asterisked material).
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from a seizure or for determining when a seizure exceeds the
bounds of an investigative stop."95 However, it appears that
without such a litmus-paper test or at least some indication
of a bottom line for ascertaining the "least intrusive means,"
this prong of the investigative detention test is fraught with
constitutional infirmities not unlike those suggested in
Kolender v. Lawson.96 In Kolender the Supreme Court ruled
unconstitutionally vague a state statute which criminalized
the failure of a person stopped on suspicion of criminal ac-
tivity under Terry to provide "'credible and reliable' identi-
fication when requested by a police office." 97 As noted by
the Court, the statute at issue contained "no standard for de-
termining what a suspect has to do in order to satisfy the
requirement to provide a 'credible and reliable' identifica-
tion. As such the statute vests virtually complete discretion
in the hands of the police to determine whether the suspect
has satisfied the statute and must be permitted to go on his
way in the absence of probable cause to arrest."98
So, too, without some further delineation of the parame-
ters of "least intrusive means," this standard vests almost
complete discretion in the hands of police to determine what
means and indeed how much information is necessary to
confirm or dispel their suspicions of criminal activity. The
implication in Royer clearly exists that had police officers in-
quired on the concourse about Royer's luggage and been un-
able thereafter to secure the trained sniff dogs, they might
well have been constitutionally permitted to pry open his
luggage without ever securing a warrant.
V. IMPACT OF PLACE
As Michigan v. Summers99 categorically extended Terry
95. 460 U.S. at 506.
96. 103 S. Ct. 1855 (1983).
97. Id. at 1857-58. Although the constitutional issues necessarily differed in view
of the attack upon the statute in Kolender, the fact remains that the standard promul-
gated in Royer allows police virtually unfettered discretion in ascertaining the quan-
tity and means of securing whatever information is necessary to confirm or dispel
their suspicions of criminal activity.
98. 103 S. Ct. at 1859.
99. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
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principles, so United States v. Place'00 perverts them. The
Place decision, as Justice Brennan stated, "finds no support
in Terry or its progeny and significantly dilutes the Fourth
Amendment's protections against government interference
with personal property."101
In United States v. Place the Supreme Court addressed
the question of whether officers can seize and investigatively
detain the luggage of a person about whom they have a rea-
sonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. As in
United States v. Mendenhal 102 and Florida v. Royer,10 3 the
Place Court was concerned with an airport investigative de-
tention of an individual suspected of trafficking in narcotics.
Place was observed by law enforcement officers as he waited
in line at the Miami International Airport to purchase a
ticket to La Guardia Airport in New York. As he proceeded
to the gate to board his flight, officers approached him and
asked for his airline ticket and identification. 104 Place com-
plied with the request and consented to the search of his two
pieces of checked luggage, but because his flight was about
to depart, the officers declined to detain him further or
search his luggage. Nevertheless, the officers did inspect the
100. 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983). See generally Comment, Demise of the Probable
Cause Requirement in Seizures of Inanimate Objects - United States v Place and
United States v. Martell, 51 U. CIN. L. REv. 405 (1982) (contending that Supreme
Court precedent does not permit a court to construe the fourth amendment reasona-
bleness clause as allowing warrantless seizures of luggage in airport narcotics investi-
gations based upon a mere reasonable suspicion).
101. Place, 103 S. Ct. at 2649 (Brennan, J., concurring). The majority ignores the
cogent argument of Justice Brennan. Although Terry stops may involve seizures of
personalty incidental to the seizure of the person, since an officer cannot seize the
person without also seizing the personalty in that person's possession at the time,
there remains a constitutional distinction between such incidental seizures and
seizures of property which are independent of the seizure of the person. Since the
fourth amendment protects both an interest in retaining possession of property and an
interest in maintaining personal privacy, the seizure of property, irrespective of a
search, implicates a protected fourth amendment interest. Thus, seizures of property
must likewise be premised upon probable cause. Id at 2649.
The decision in Place, therefore, significantly expands the scope of a Terry stop in
that it permits a seizure of luggage, independent of the seizure of the person, upon a
showing of something less than probable cause. In this respect, the Place decision
also represents a radical departure from well-established fourth amendment
principles.
102. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
103. 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983).
104. Place, 103 S. Ct. at 2639-40.
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address tags on respondent's checked luggage and noted dis-
crepancies in the two street addresses. Their further investi-
gation revealed that neither address existed and that the
telephone number Place had given them was likewise fic-
ticious. On the basis of this information, the Miami agents
contacted DEA authorities in New York who then waited
for Place at La Guardia.
After Place had claimed his bags, the New York agents
stopped him and identified themselves as federal narcotics
agents. They informed him that from their observations of
him and information relayed to them by Miami agents, they
believed he might be carrying narcotics. They then re-
quested and received identification from Place. When he re-
fused to consent to a search of his luggage, however, one of
the agents took the luggage, informing Place that he in-
tended to request a search warrant and that Place was free to
accompany them. 105 Place declined. The agents then took
his luggage to Kennedy Airport where it was subjected to a
sniff test by a trained narcotics detection dog. This proce-
dure worked to deprive Place of his luggage for approxi-
mately ninety minutes. The dog reacted positively to one of
the bags and ambiguously to the other. Since the event tran-
spired late Friday afternoon, however, the agents retained
the luggage until Monday morning, at which time they se-
cured a warrant to search the other bag. Upon opening that
bag, the agents discovered cocaine.
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor framed the
issue so as to come precisely within the situation suggested
by the Royer Court: "[W]hether the Fourth Amendment
prohibits law enforcement authorities from temporarily de-
taining personal luggage for exposure to a trained narcotics
detection dog on the basis of reasonable suspicion that the
luggage contains narcotics."'' 0 6 In responding negatively to
this issue, though ultimately finding a constitutionally im-
permissible detention, the Supreme Court made an unquali-
fied leap in the application of Terry. What was originally
contemplated as a test for the reasonableness of a seizure of
the person under very limited circumstances had evolved
105. Id. at 2640.
106. Id. at 2639.
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into a test for the independent investigative seizure of prop-
erty - a matter which finds no support in Terry or its prog-
eny, save for the dicta in Royer.
The Court began its analysis, therefore, not with a con-
sideration of the language of Terry, but with a citation to the
language of Michigan v. Summers,10 7 which, as previously in-
dicated, had categorically broadened the limited exception
to the probable cause requirement stated in Terry. Thus,
O'Connor's initial premise in Royer, that "[i]n Terry the
Court first recognized 'the narrow authority of police officers
who suspect criminal activity to make limited intrusion on
an individual's personal security based on less than probable
cause,' "108 is not a reflection of Terry at all, but is instead a
Summers statement justifying the extension of Terry
principles.
The Place Court noted that ownership of property, like
"personal liberty," is susceptible to varying degrees of intru-
sion.10 9 It observed that, just as there are some seizures of
the person which are significantly less intrusive than arrest,
there may be some seizures of personalty which are signifi-
cantly less intrusive than a complete loss of custody and con-
trol. 0 Thus, the court reasoned that the fourth amendment
rationale for a Terry stop is likewise applicable to investiga-
tive detentions of personalty. It concluded:
Given the fact that seizures of property can vary in intru-
siveness, some brief detentions of personal effects may be
so minimally intrusive of Fourth Amendment interests that
strong countervailing governmental interests will justify a
seizure based only on specific articulable facts that the
property contains contraband or evidence of a crime."'
107. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
108. Place, 103 S. Ct. at 2642 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 698
(1981)).
109. 103 S. Ct. at 2643 ("The intrusion on possessory interests occasioned by a
seizure of one's personal effects can vary both in its nature and extent.").
110. Place had argued the inapplicability of the Terry rationale to his facts be-
cause, unlike a seizure of the person, there existed no degrees of intrusion with respect
to the seizure of personality. He argued that "[o]nce the owner's property is seized.
the dispossession is absolute." 1d. The Court, however, apparently turned the answer
to that argument into one of the bases for extending Terry to personality. Absent this
discussion, it is difficult to ascertain any basis at all upon which the Court extended
Terry.
I11. Id. at 2644.
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Such "strong countervailing governmental interests"
were, of course, found to be present in Place, just as in Men-
denhall, because of the compelling governmental need to ap-
prehend persons who traffic for profit in contraband. In
making that determination, the Court specifically rejected
the argument of Justice Stewart in his dissent in Summers,
which was echoed by Place, that "a generalized interest in
law enforcement cannot justify an intrusion on an individ-
ual's Fourth Amendment interests in the absence of prob-
able cause."1 2 The Court emphasized that the balancing
test is between the individual's fourth amendment rights and
those governmental interests which are "sufficiently substan-
tial," not governmental interests which are "independent of
the interest in investigating crimes effectively and appre-
hending suspects."'"13
The second phase of the Terry reasonableness test as ap-
plied to the luggage required, as indicated, "specific artic-
ulable facts that the property contains contraband."'"14 In
this respect, as in others noted earlier, an important question
remains unanswered by the Court: that is, whether a reason-
able suspicion that an individual is trafficking in narcotics
will be sufficient to constitute a reasonable suspicion that his
or her luggage likewise contains narcotics. For example, if a
traveler meets the drug courier profile and there exists a rea-
sonable suspicion that the person is trafficking in narcotics,
does there then necessarily exist a reasonable suspicion to
detain his or her luggage? There appears to be little doubt
under the facts in Place. The Court undertook no discussion
of whether there existed a reasonable suspicion that Place's
luggage contained narcotics. Such an omission is under-
standable if in fact the issues are identical, since the Court
had previously denied certiorari on the issue of reasonable
suspicion to believe Place was engaged in criminal activ-
112. Id at 2643. See also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 707 (1981) (Stew-
art, J., dissenting), in which Stewart stated: "The common denominator of the Terry
cases. . . is the presence of some governmental interest independent of the ordinary
interest in investigating crime and apprehending suspects, an interest important
enough to overcome the presumptive constitutional restraints on police conduct."
113. Place, 103 S. Ct. at 2643.
114. Id. at 2644.
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ity." 5 The question nevertheless remains, particularly
where, as here, the suspect is then released.
The investigative detention of Place's luggage ultimately
failed the constitutional test of reasonableness because the
scope of the investigative detention of his luggage had been
exceeded, resulting in the constitutional necessity of prob-
able cause. The Government had argued for a broader
scope to the investigative detention of luggage or personalty
than that employed to test the investigative detention of a
person, reasoning that "seizures of property are generally
less intrusive than seizures of the person."'1 6 Acknowledg-ing that the Government's premise might be true in some
cases, the Court nonetheless rejected that argument in cases
involving detention of luggage seized from a suspect's cus-
tody because "such a seizure can effectively restrain the per-
son since he is subjected to the possible disruption of his
travel plans in order to remain with his luggage or to arrange
for its return."'"17
Therefore, the Court concluded that "when the police
seize luggage from the suspect's custody"" 8 the limitations
which define the scope of investigative detentions of the per-
son must necessarily define the scope of an investigative de-
tention of luggage based on less than probable cause. 19
Applying the criteria established by the Terry decision and
clarified in the Royer decision, the Court determined first
that the canine sniff was, because of its unique nature, a
constitutionally proper investigative procedure:
[T]he canine sniff is suigeneris. We are aware of no other
investigative procedure that is so limited both in the man-
ner in which the information is obtained and in the content
of the information revealed by the procedure. Therefore,
we conclude that the particular course of investigation that
the agents intended to pursue here - exposure of re-
spondent's luggage, which was located in a public place, to
a trained canine - did not constitute a "search" within the
115. Id.
116. Id at 2645.
117. Id at 2645.
118. Id.
119. Id
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meaning of the Fourth Amendment.120
Thus, what was implied in the Royer decision became law in
the Place decision.
The detention of Place's luggage, however, exceeded the
scope of an investigative detention because of the length of
time the luggage had been detained by the New York agents.
Although the Court specifically declined to adopt any
outside time limitation for a permissible Terry stop,121 it nev-
ertheless concluded that the ninety-minute period of time at
issue in Place was unreasonable under the circumstances
presented: "[W]e have never approved a seizure of the per-
son for the prolonged 90-minute period involved here and
cannot do so on the facts presented by this case." 122 The
Court pointed out that the New York agents knew the time
of Place's scheduled arrival at La Guardia and had ample
time to have arranged for the canine sniff test at that loca-
tion, rather than removing his luggage to Kennedy Airport.
They could therefore have minimized the intrusion upon
Place's fourth amendment interests.1 23 Moreover, the Court
determined that the violation of Place's fourth amendment
rights was exacerbated in this instance by the DEA agents'
failure to accurately inform respondent of the place to which
they were transporting his luggage, the length of time hemight be dispossessed, and the arrangements that would be
made for the return of the luggage if the investigation dis-
pelled their suspicion. 124 The impact of these additional cri-
teria upon the scope limitation is, of course, critical if the
issue becomes whether police planted the contraband.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEST
A study of the investigative-detention evolution discloses
that since 1968 there have emerged three types of police-citi-
zen confrontation, each requiring different constitutional
protections. At one end of the spectrum there is the simple
120. Id
121. Id at 2644-45.
122. Id. at 2646. For comparison, the Court noted that the A.L.I. MODEL CODE
OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2(1) (1975), recommends a maximum of
twenty minutes for a Terry stop. 103 S. Ct. at 2646 n.10.
123. 103 S. Ct. at 2646.
124. Id. at 2645-46.
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encounter which does not constitute a seizure and carries
with it no constitutional protection. At the other end of the
spectrum there exists an arrest which requires probable
cause. The remaining encounters which have categorically
achieved Supreme Court recognition are "seizures" which
fall short of an arrest - artfully termed "investigative deten-
tions." These are identified as situations in which a reason-
able person, in view of all the circumstances, believes that he
or she is not free to leave because of some identifiable con-
duct on the part of law enforcement officers. Whether such
seizures are constitutional is dependent upon whether they
qualify as "reasonable" under the fourth amendment.
The constitutional test of reasonableness requires at its
threshold a balancing of the legitimate governmental inter-
ests against the nature of the intrusion. It appears here that
the Court is most liberal in its assessment of the weight of
preventive law enforcement interests. If that balance weighs
in favor of the government, the next step is to assess the rea-
sonableness of police conduct. There are two phases for as-
certaining the reasonableness of the police conduct. First,
the officer's action must be justified at its inception; there
must exist a reasonable and articulable basis giving rise to a
suspicion of criminal activity on the part of the suspect. Sec-
ond, the scope of the officer's conduct must be reasonably
related to the justification for the detention.
The scope of the detention is in turn reasonably related
to the justification for the detention if. (1) it is confined to
the purpose for which the suspect was originally stopped (a
matter largely within the discretion of law enforcement of-
ficers); (2) it is temporary and lasts no longer than is neces-
sary to either effectuate the purpose of the stop or dispel the
officer's initial suspicion; and (3) the methods used to either
effectuate the purpose of the stop or dispel the officer's initial
suspicion are the least intrusive means reasonably available.
If the scope of the detention is exceeded in any of these re-
spects, there is no longer merely an investigative detention
but a constructive arrest, for which probable cause must
exist.
Although the test is capable of delineation at least to this
extent, it far from insures legitimate constitutional limitation
upon preventive law enforcement practices. Furthermore, as
1984]
672 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:641
indicated by the Place opinion, the same test is ostensibly
applicable to the seizure of luggage or like personalty within
the possession of a suspect if there exists a reasonable and
articulable basis for suspecting that such personalty contains
contraband.
